The expected returns of ESG excluded stocks. Shocks to firms costs of capital? Evidence from the Worlds' largest fund.

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Overview

- Research Issue
- Our Analysis Preview
- 3 Literature
- 4 The oil fund and its exclusions
 - Data
- 5 Empirics Part I: Estimating the green return premium
 - Empirics I: Constructing the Exclusion Portfolio
 - Empirics I: Value evolution
 - Empirics I: Estimates of the green return premium
- 6 Empirics Part II: Deciding whether to improve to get exclusion revoked
 - Empirics II.A: What determines time till exclusion is revoked?
 - Empirics II.B: Benefits from cheaper capital
 - Empirics II.C: Another estimate of benefit of low cost of capital
 - Empirics II.D: Post-Exclusion portfolio
- Conclusion

Research issue

- ESG Environmental, Social and Governance aspects of corporate decisions.
- Institutional investors unwilling to invest in "bad" ESG firms.
- Generally Does ESG affect companies?
 - Cost of capital/stock return?
 - Pecuniary view (The BlackRock Argument)
 Firms preparing for the new sustainable economy
 - → will do better (doing well by doing good).

 (Misprising argument)
 - (Mispricing argument)
 - Non-pecuniary view.
 Investors care about sustainability in addition to returns.
 - → Sustainable firms have lower cost of capital.
 - Company Behaviour?
 - Do companies take actions to avoid being excluded?
- How best to save the planet?

Research issue ctd

Our research: The exclusions by Norway's GPFG "(The oil Fund)"

- Huge Sovereign Wealth Fund.
 - Exclusions ethically motivated "worst offenders"
 - Investigate:
 - The return of the portfolio of excluded firms
 - Lead to estimate of Green Return Premium
 - Firm reactions to their exclusions
 - Behavioural changes?

Our Analysis - Preview

Construct portfolio of excluded firms.

- Is there a return premium (alpha) on this portfolio?
 - ightarrow Yes
- Is this due to short-term overreactions, or long term cost of capital?
 - \rightarrow It is the long term cost of capital
- Implication: Premium on being ethical ("Green Return Premium")
 - ightarrow pprox -5%

After firms get on the exclusion list

- Are firms happy with their high cost of capital?
 - ightarrow No, they try get their exclusions revoked to get back to a lower cost of capital.
- If a firm's exclusion is revoked, what happens to cost of capital?
 - → It Falls

Literature etc

Modelling differences in cost of capital due to ESG

- The pecuniary view.
 - Stock prices do not fully reflect future ESG consequences (e.g. climate).
 - Short-termism (Stein, 1989)
- The non-pecuniary view
 - Equilibrium models tradeoff ESG/Cost of Capital
 - Pástor et al. (2021) Pedersen et al. (2021)
 - Question magnitude exclusion effects (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2022)
 - ESG ranking uncertainty muddle tradeoff (Avramov et al., 2022)

Estimates of Green Return Premium

- Evidence support non-pecuniary view (Green Return Premium < 0)
 Examples (estimated return difference)
 - Sin (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009) (-3.5%)
 - Environment (Chava, 2014) (-0.7% to -1.4%)
 - ullet Green vs Brown (Pástor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2022) (-1.4%)

Literature ctd – The magnitude of the green premium

Cost of improving ESG argument

The return difference is a tradeoff between:

- Cost of removing reasons for exclusion (becoming more ethical)
- Benefits from lower cost of capital.

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Example from (Hong, Wang, and Yang, 2023) (decarbonization):
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Equilibrium return difference (green premium)= -m/q,

 $(m - \cos t)$ of mitigation per unit of production, q - price of firm capital.

ightarrow If green premium reflects costs of mitigation,

green return premium can be large

Arbitrage type counterargument (Berk and van Binsbergen, 2022)

Investors not concerned with ESG jump on return premium

→ Green premium should be small in magnitude.

Literature ctd – Prior analysis of the oil fund's exclusions

- Event studies. Negative CAR when exclusion announced
 - Atta-Darkua (2022),
 - Ayoubi and Enjolras (2020),
 - Eriksen, Lindset, Nguyen, and Skara (2020).
- Long term performance of excluded portfolio.
 (Hoepner and Schopohl, 2018) Shorter time period.


Norway's GPFG (The Oil Fund)

- World's largest SWF. Market value of equity 1 trillion USD at the end of 2021.
- One of the most transparent such funds, model for many institutional investors.
- Near index fund.
- Exclusions handled by external "Council of Ethics", established 2004.
 - 2004–2021: 189 firms in total excluded, shorter or longer time periods.
 - At yearend 2021, fund invested in \approx 10 thousand companies
 - ullet ightarrow exclusions are truly exceptional

Norway's GPFG – The reasons for exclusions

Exclusion reasons	Events
Conduct	67
Environmental damage	28
Individuals' rights in war or conflict	12
Violation of human rights	12
Environmental damage / Violation of human rights	4
Violation of ethical norms	5
Greenhouse gas emissions	4
Gross corruption	2
Product	122
Coal or coal-based energy	75
Weapons	26
Tobacco	21


Norway's GPFG – The number of exclusions




Norway's GPFG – Size (market cap) distribution of excluded firms

B.1: Mkt Cap \leq 10 bill USD

B.2: Mkt Cap > 10 bill USD





Empirics Part I: Estimating the green return premium

- Construct the returns of Exclusion portfolio
- Asset pricing evaluation of return difference (alpha)
- Robustness.
- Consequences for the green return premium.

Empirics I: Constructing the Exclusion Portfolio


Firms enter portfolio month after exclusion



• If exclusion revoked, firms leave exclusion portfolio next month.



Empirics I: Value evolution – exclusion portfolio vs market



Cumulative returns of equally weighted exclusion and global market portfolios

Empirics I: Estimates of the green return premium

Brown return premium (return premium for excluded firms) estimated as

- Alpha (the risk-adjusted excess return) of the Excluded Portfolio.
- Estimated using: Fama-French international five factor model

$$(r_{p,t} - r_{f,t}) = \alpha + \beta(r_{m,t} - r_{f,t}) + b^{SMB}SMB_t + b^{HML}HML_t + b^{RMW}RMW_t + b^{CMA}CMA_t + \varepsilon_{p,t},$$

- This model nececcary to control for business cycle effects (Bansal et al., 2021)
- (do show estimates with alternative asset pricing models)

Empirics I: Estimates of alpha for (EW) Exclusion Portfolio

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alpha	0.004***	0.004**	0.004***	0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rm-Rf	0.961***	1.021***	0.993***	0.962***
	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.049)
SMB	0.173		0.178	0.177
	(0.115)		(0.115)	(0.123)
HML	0.467***		0.310***	0.224***
	(0.115)		(0.074)	(0.089)
RMW	0.155			
	(0.156)			
CMA	-0.257			
	(0.233)			
WML				-0.138***
				(0.076)
Annualized Alphas(percent)	5.170	4.420	5.220	5.980
Adj. R ²	0.809	0.788	0.808	0.813

Empirics I: From alpha to green return premium

- Alpha: > 5% in annual terms economically and statistically significant
- Finding robust to
 - asset pricing model
 - weighting scheme (equal, value weighted)
 - subportfolios: reason for exclusion, country (US).

Conclude:

The alpha is the premium on unethical excluded firms.

The green return premium then the negative of this.

 \rightarrow We estimate a (negative) green premium of $\approx -5\%$.

Empirics I: Concern: Short term announcement effect

Potential contribution to the high estimate (5%)

- Short term price pressure from exclusion?
- Changes to long term cost of capital?

Various estimates to show this is not only a short term effect

- Wait longer before enter exclusion portfolio
- Look at exclusion portfolio before oil funds exclusion
- Event study estimates $\approx 1.5\%$ (one time event).
- ightarrow The estimated return is chiefly due to long-term return differences.

Empirics I: Conclude: Green premium estimates

- The green premium is negative, in line with
 - a non-pecuniary explanation,
 - the majority of estimates in the literature.
- The point estimate of -5% is larger in magnitude than most other estimates
 - Possibly due to the sample being only the "worst offenders"

Empirics Part II: Firms deciding whether to improve to get exclusion revoked

Point when an exclusion is announced

- from potential to actual exclusion
- \rightarrow Revision of expectations
- expected cost of capital increase?

Time to revisit the firm's evaluation of the tradeoff?

Sample: Exclusions revoked due to:

Cause	no
Change of product mix	11
Cease of activity	7
Sale of subsidiary	4
Other reasons	6
Total	28

Empirics II - Revoking exclusions - analysis

Actions to improve ESG leading to exclusion revoked

- ightarrow Endogenous action by firms
- Trading off
 - Cost of improving ESG (Cause of exclusion)
 - Benefits from a lower cost of capital (cheaper to raise capital)

Motivate empirical investigations – proxies

- A. Costs of improving ESG score when excluded.
- Benefits of low cost of capital
 - B. Capital needs (Revenue increase → Need for scale investments)
 - C. Actual capital raising.
- D. Result of action cost of capital after exclusion revoked.

Empirics II.A: What determines time till exclusion is revoked?

Duration (survival) analysis of exit from Exclusion Portfolio.

Allows estimation of how e.g. cost of improvement affects time till exit. Estimates

- ESG score when excluded (negative coefficient)
 - → Low ESG score when entering exclusion portfolio
 - \rightarrow lower time till exit.

Possible interpretation: Cost of improving ESG low when starting from a low (ESG) base.

Controls:

- Conduct based exclusion dummy (easier to fix conduct based than product based reasons for exclusion)
- Firm Market Capitalization

Empirics II.B: Benefits from cheaper cost of capital

Benefits of low cost of capital arise when firm needs to raise new external capital.

Argue: Higher likelihood of raising capital – increased benefits.

Empirically: Higher Revenue – Higher investment needs

Empirical formulation:

Probit - Model probability of having exclusions revoked as a function of

- Revenue growth negative relation:
 High revenue growth → higher probability of exclusion revoked.
- Earnings growth no relation

Empirics II.C: Another estimate of benefit of low cost of capital

Actual equity deals - raising new equity capital

High probability of raising capital after exclusion revoked

	Firms raising capital		
	Number	Percent	
Firms still excluded	56	37.1	
Firms with exclusion revoked	11	57.9	

Empirics II.D: Do cost of capital fall after exclusion revoked?

Estimates of alpha for the post-exclusion portfolio

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alpha	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rm-Rf	1.080***	1.085***	1.061***	1.033***
	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.076)
SMB	0.335		0.250	0.245
	(0.221)		(0.209)	(0.208)
HML	0.271		0.235*	0.128
	(0.215)		(0.123)	(0.144)
RMW	0.326			
	(0.292)			
CMA	0.107			
	(0.345)			
WML				-0.192
				(0.136)
Annualized Alphas(percent)	-2.230	-1.970	-0.860	0.300
Adj. R ²	0.604	0.596	0.606	0.609
Num obs	149	149	149	149

Key takeaways

- **1** Green return premium estimate $\approx -5\%$.
 - Negative in line with most of literature
 - Magnitude of the return difference linked to ESG higher than most estimates, possibly due to sample of "worst offenders."
- Oynamics of corporate reactions to exclusion. More likely to see exclusion revoked if
 - ESG "really bad" at exclusion (cheaper to rectify?)
 - Revenue growth high (investment needs?)

Extra tables and results



Extra material - data - Exclusions over time

Year	New Exclusions	Exclusions Revoked	Re- exclusions
2005	9		
2006	11	1	
2007	2		
2008	4		
2009	5	2	
2010	21	1	
2011	5	1	
2012	1		
2013	9	3	
2014	1	1	
2015	4		
2016	61		
2017	11	1	
2018	13	2	1
2019	5	6	
2020	15	3	
2021	12	5	
Total	189	26	1

Extra material - data - Exclusions by industry

Industry	TRBC Code	Exclusions	Exclusions Revoked
Electrical Utilities & IPPs	591010	56	2
Aerospace & Defense	521010	20	7
Food & Tobacco	541020	18	
Coal	501010	14	
Metals & Mining	512010	14	3
Construction & Engineering	522010	10	1
Oil & Gas	501020	9	3
Chemicals	511010	6	2
Paper & Forest Products	513010	5	
Pharmaceuticals	562010	5	
Freight & Logistics Services	524050	4	1
Textiles & Apparel	532020	4	1
Consumer Goods Conglomerates	544010	3	1
Multiline Utilities	591040	3	
Real Estate Operations	601010	3	
Automobiles & Auto Parts	531010	2	1
Homebuilding & Construction Supplies	532030	2	1
Machinery, Equipment & Components	521020	2	
Professional & Commercial Services	522030	2	
Communications & Networking	571020	1	
Diversified Industrial Goods Wholesalers	522020	1	
Diversified Retail	534020	1	1
Food & Drug Retailing	543010	1	1
Hotels & Entertainment Services	533010	1	
Insurance	553010	1	1
Specialty Retailers	534030	1	

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Total

26

189

Extra material - data - Exclusions by country

Country	Exclusions	Exclusions Revoked
United States	51	10
China	27	2
India	13	
United Kingdom	11	5
Israel	10	
Canada	9	1
Japan	8	
Malaysia	8	
South Korea	7	1
Brazil	5	
Australia	4	
Poland	4	1
South Africa	3	1
Taiwan	3	
Thailand	3 2 2 2 2	1
Chile	2	
Czech Republic	2	
France	2	1
Mexico	2	2
Netherlands	2 2	
Philippines		
Egypt	1	
Germany	1	
Greece	1	
Indonesia	1	
Ireland	1	
Italy	1	1
Peru	1	
Russian Federation	1	

Extra material - data - Sample of stocks

Status	Events
Total exclusions	189
Exclusion revoked	26
Excluded again	1
Not matched with Refinitiv	5
Total sample	184
Conduct-based exclusions	67
Product-based exclusions	122

Overview of the exclusions, revocations and sample content. Data from the Ethical council, GPFG and Refinitiv.

Extra material - data - Equity data - Descriptives

		mean		
Monthly Return (percent)	-72.8	1.1	0.6	166.2
Market Cap (bill USD)	0.0	20.4	6.0	315.8

Extra material - exclusion portfolio - Descriptives

Panel A: Equally weighted exclusion portfolio

		gnn				
			EW Exclusion Portfolios			
	Market	All	All Conduct Product Coal			
Average return (%)	0.79	1.17	1.44	1.00	1.02	1.24
Std.dev	0.79	5.21	7.73	4.92	4.33	5.06
Average excess return $(\%)$	0.01	1.07	1.35	0.91	0.94	1.14
Sharpe Ratio	0.15	0.21	0.17	0.18	0.22	0.23
n	199	199	199	196	69	199

Panel B: Value weighted exclusion portfolio

	VW Exclusion Portfolios					
	Market All Conduct Product Coal					
Average return(%)	0.79	1.37	1.67	1.22	1.27	1.37
Std.dev	0.79	4.23	5.64	4.77	3.47	4.11
Average excess return $(\%)$	0.01	1.28	1.58	1.13	1.19	1.28
Sharpe Ratio	0.15	0.30	0.28	0.24	0.34	0.31
n	199	199	199	196	69	199

Describing portfolio returns for the various exclusion portfolios. All returns in USD. Returns and

Extra material - exclusion portfolio - Estimates of alpha for (VW) Exclusion Portfolio


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Alpha	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rm-Rf	0.871***	0.801***	0.809***	0.817***
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)
SMB	-0.313***	, ,	-0.421^{***}	-0.421^{***}
	(0.113)		(0.116)	(0.111)
HML	0.183*		0.264***	0.287***
	(0.102)		(0.078)	(0.100)
RMW	0.340***		, ,	, ,
	(0.143)			
CMA	0.373***			
	(0.139)			
WML	,			0.036
				(0.064)

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
Extra material - exclusion portfolio - Conduct and product based value evolution (EW)

Panel A: Equally weighted exclusion portfolio



Extra material - exclusion portfolio - Conduct and product based value evolution (VW)

Panel B: Value weighted exclusion portfolio




Extra material - exclusion portfolio - Conduct and product based exclusion

	Conduct		Product	
	EW	VW	EW	VW
Alpha	0.007*	0.009***	0.003	0.004**
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Rm-Rf	1.061***	0.793***	0.926***	0.935***
	(0.130)	(0.077)	(0.037)	(0.037)
SMB	0.139	-0.269	0.167	-0.280^{**}
	(0.293)	(0.255)	(0.136)	(0.128)
HML	0.967 [*] **	0.293	0.295 [*] **	0.208*
	(0.214)	(0.165)	(0.107)	(0.107)
RMW	0.231	0.419	0.164	0.345 [*]
	(0.349)	(0.285)	(0.174)	(0.211)
CMA	-1.241^{***}	0.306	0.070	0.305 [*]
	(0.412)	(0.244)	(0.167)	(0.157)
Annualized Alphas(percent)	8 540	11 310	3 370	4 680


Extra material - exclusion portfolio - US Exclusion Portfolio

Panel A: Number of exclusions



Extra material - exclusion portfolio - US Exclusion Portfolio

Panel B: Cumulative returns



Extra material - exclusion portfolio - US Exclusion Portfolio

	Equally Weighted	Value Weighted
Alpha	0.004*	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rm-Rf	0.925***	0.783***
	(0.050)	(0.045)
SMB	0.012	-0.280***
	(0.089)	(0.080)
HML	0.239***	0.168***
	(0.081)	(0.073)
RMW	0.050	0.258***
	(0.117)	(0.106)
CMA	0.073	0.173
	(0.146)	(0.132)
Annualized Alphas(percent)	4.870	7.200
Adj. R ²	0.710	0.644
Num. obs.	200	200

Extra material - exclusion portfolio - Alpha estimation for Subperiods

Panel A: Equally weighted exclusion portfolio.

	(2005–15)	(2016–21)
Alpha	0.006***	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Rm-Rf	0.955***	0.930***
	(0.057)	(0.071)
SMB	0.070	0.372*
	(0.130)	(0.165)
HML	0.331**	0.231
	(0.188)	(0.145)
RMW	-0.027	0.197
	(0.297)	(0.176)
CMA	-0.623***	0.458*
	(0.154)	(0.252)
Annualized Alphas(percent)	7.860	3.320


Extra material - exclusion portfolio - Alpha estimation for Subperiods

Panel B: Value weighted exclusion portfolio.

	(2005–15)	(2016-21)
Alpha	0.007***	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.001)
Rm-Rf	0.840***	0.958***
	(0.040)	(0.046)
SMB	-0.402***	-0.317^{*}
	(0.134)	(0.161)
HML	-0.064	0.128
	(0.141)	(0.178)
RMW	0.274	0.183
	(0.195)	(0.203)
CMA	0.168	0.704***
	(0.144)	(0.264)
Annualized Alphas(percent)	8.440	5.010


Extra material – Revoking exclusion – Post-Exclusion portfolio

Panel A: Number of stocks with exclusions revoked and still listed




Extra material – Revoking exclusion – Duration (survival) analysis of exit from Exclusion Portfolio

Panel A. Survival curve



Extra material – Revoking exclusion – Duration (survival) analysis of exit from Exclusion Portfolio

Panel B. Instantaneous hazard curve (smoothed)




Extra material – Revoking exclusion – Duration (survival) analysis of exit from Exclusion Portfolio

Contributions to survival of exclusion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ESG Score	-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.02**	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ind(Conduct)		0.85**		0.98***
		(0.39)		(0.44)
In(Mkt Cap)			-0.05	-0.11
			(0.09)	(0.10)
AIC	219.27	217.21	221.05	218.16
R^2	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.07
Max. R ²	0.77	0.77	0.77	0.77
Num. events	28	28	28	28
Num. obs.	150	150	150	150
PH test	0.47	0.76	0.55	0.68

^{***}p < 0.025; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1

Extra material – Revoking exclusion – ESG Scores for firms with/without exclusion revoked




Extra material – Revoking exclusion – Probit estimation of determinants of discontinuation of exclusion

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	-3.53***	-2.26***	-2.24***	-3.38***
	(1.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(1.13)
Growth EPS	-0.02	-0.02		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Ind(Conduct)	0.69***	0.66***	0.52***	0.54***
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
In(Mkt Cap)	0.06			0.05
	(0.05)			(0.05)
Growth Revenue			0.46*	0.45^{*}
			(0.26)	(0.26)
Log Likelihood	-97.86	-98.51	-99.08	-98.55
Num. obs.	981	981	969	969

Extra material - The Post-Exclusion portfolio

Firms enter the post-exclusion portfolio month after exclusion is revoked.




Cumulative returns for the Post-Exclusion Portfolio

Extra analysis - Is revocation a selection issue?

- The Exclusion portfolio firms only in portfolio while excluded.
- Remove firms *post* exclusion. Selection problem?
 - What is the return on the portfolio of post-excluded firms?
 - What if we keep firms in the portfolio even if the exclusion is revoked?

Extra analysis - Is revocation a selection issue? - Keeping the firms with exclusion revoked

Compare Exclusion Portfolio with corresponding portfolio where firms whose exclusion is revoked is kept



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