Board gender-balancing, network information, and insider trading

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Forskermøtet, Stavanger. Oct 2022

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
Board gender-balancing

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Summary of what we do

- (1) We propose and test the following basic network hypothesis: Increased access to an informal network of peer-firm insiders \Rightarrow enhanced value of insider information
- (2) We use two quasi-experimental settings relevant for insider trades
 - (i) Female director network shock: Norway's pioneering quota law
 - (ii) Exogenous price shock caused by the financial crisis
- (3) We use population data on primary insider trades and holdings
- (4) Three empirical inquiries:
 - (i) The network shock \Rightarrow increased <u>information content</u> of trades?
 - (ii) The network shock \Rightarrow increased insider performance?
 - (iii) Trading during crisis period \Rightarrow relative female <u>risk</u> <u>aversion</u>?

Board size and fraction female directors




OSE-listed ASA, 1998-2016

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Number of board seats held by male and female directors



(all ASA)


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Board gender-balancing


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Evolution of board network gender composition

Year 2002



Year 2008




(all ASA)

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Fraction primary insider trades by females



Numbers in percent

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Market reaction

- The fact that an insider buys.
 - Lead other market participants to revise (upward) their valuation?
 - Investigate market reaction (percentage price change).
- $\bullet \ \rightarrow \ \mathsf{Event} \ \mathsf{Study}$

Questions asked:

Does the magnitude of market reaction depend

- In gender of the particular insider trading?
- On network (connectedness) of the particular insider trading?

Market reaction to non-routine primary insider purchases

Event windows (τ_1, τ_2)

$$r_{it}^e = a_i + b_i r_{mt}^e + \gamma_i (\tau_1, \tau_2) D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

	A: Pre-qu	iota years		B: Post-qu	B: Post-quota years		
Event window:	(-1,1)	(-1,5)		(-1,1)	(-1,5)		
Female Insider	rs						
$\gamma(\tau_1, \tau_2)$	0.0026	0.0069		0.0155***	0.0147***		
Obs.	(0.002) 209,427	(0.001) 209,427	· · · · · · ·	(0.001) 309,470	(0.001) 309,470		
Male Insiders							
$\gamma(\tau_1, \tau_2)$	0.014***	0.014***		0.014**	0.013		
Obs.	(0.001) 507,385	(0.001) 507,385	· · · · · · ·	(0.002) 470,032	(0.002) 470,032	nøtet, Sta	
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Effect of network centrality (pagerank) on market reaction

 $\gamma_i(\tau_1, \tau_2) = \alpha_i + \beta_1 M kt Cap_i + \beta_2 TradeSize_i + \beta_3 Centrality_i + \varepsilon_i$

	Cumula	ative abnori	mal return	$\gamma(\tau_1, \tau_2)$
	$\gamma(-1,1)$	$\gamma(-1,5)$	$\gamma(-1, 20)$	$\gamma(-1, 50)$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Constant	0.072***	0.157***	0.257***	0.516***
	(0.014)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.074)
MktCap	-0.004***	-0.007***	-0.012***	-0.023***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
TradeSize	-0.0002	-0.001	-0.0004	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Centrality	2.147***	1.614*	3.144**	0.276
	(0.482)	(0.886)	(1.462)	(2.565)

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The Performance of Insiders

Worry behind insider regulations:

Are corporate insiders able to translate insider knowledge into "unfair" trading profits?

Methodological contribution:

 Performance analysis using changes in insider *holdings*. Most accurate method to measure informational content in insider trades

Conclude:

- The insider portfolio does *not* show superior performance.
- There is no gender difference in this result

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How should insiders react to price drop (financial crisis)?

- Buy equity to rebalance optimal savings portfolio.
- Buy (own) equity if the informed view is that crisis drop led stock to be undervalued.


Both depend on risk aversion.

Gender differences in

Insider trading during crisis $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ risk aversion


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Likelihood of director purchases during the financial crisis



Female purchases

Male purchases



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Main conclusions

- (1) Following the dramatic female director network expansion, the market for the first time assigns valuable information to reported purchases by female primary insiders
- (2) However, tracking insiders' actual holding periods reveals that female insiders <u>do not</u> realize abnormal holdings-based abnormal performance either before or after the forced expansion of the female director network.
- (3) Both male and female primary insiders increase purchases during the financial crisis period—with similar increases in trading likelihood.
- (4) With about equal-sized male and female director networks at the time of the crisis, and since we find no evidence of abnormal performance resulting from the insider trades during the crisis period, the increased purchase intensity suggests that female directors are no more risk averse than their male counterparts.

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Additional analysis and tables

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Insider portfolio weights

Using the population of insider holdings at all times

- ω_{it} = weight of insider holdings in firm *i* at time *t*
- $S_{it} = \text{firm } i$'s total number of shares outstanding at time t
- s_{it} = number of shares held by insider
- $s_{it}p_{it}$ = market value of insiders' holding in period t

$$\omega_{it} \equiv \begin{cases} \omega_{it}^{ow} = s_{it}/S_{it} & \text{insider ownership weight} \\ \omega_{it}^{vw} = p_{it}s_{it}/\sum_{i=1}^{N_t} p_{it}s_{it} & \text{insider value weight} \end{cases}$$

Two alternative measures of the weight change $\Delta \omega_{it}$:

 $\Delta \omega_{it} \equiv \begin{cases} \omega_{it} - \omega_{i,t-1} & \text{insider weight change} \\ \omega_{it} - \omega_{i,t-1}^m & \text{market-adjusted insider weight change} \end{cases}$ $\omega_{i,t-1}^m = \text{firm } i\text{'s value-weight in the OSE market portfolio at } t - 1.$

Cross-sectional holdings-based performance measure: "Buy low and sell high?"

 $r_{i,t+1} - E[r_{i,t+1}] =$ the one-month abnormal stock return

$$cov(\omega_{it}; r_{i,t+1}) = E(\omega_{it}(r_{i,t+1} - E[r_{i,t+1}))) \\ = E[(\omega_{it} - E[\omega_{it}])r_{i,t+1}]$$

Our cross-sectional, holdings-based performance measure combines <u>both</u> unexpected weight changes $(\omega_{it} - E[\omega_{i,t-1}])$ and abnormal stock returns:

$$HCM = \frac{1}{T-2} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{1}{N_t} \left(\sum_{t=1}^{N_t} cov \left(\omega_{it} - E[\omega_{i,t-1}]; r_{i,t+\tau} - E[r_{i,t+\tau}] \right) \right)$$

 $\tau=$ number of months until the inside information becomes public (We use $\tau=1,3,6)$

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Zero pre-quota cross-sectional holdings-based performance

(HCM, 1997-2007)

			ler-owner folio weig		р	e hts	
		Female	Male	p(diff)	Female	Male	p(diff)
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A.1: HCM with Sho	rt-lived insider info	ormation:	one-mor	th futur	e return l	norizon ($\tau =$	1)
Δ_{it} : lagged insider por							,
$cov(w_{it}^{ins}-w_{i,t-1}^{ins};$	$r_{i,t+1} - \overline{E}[r_{i,t+1}])$	0.0007	-0.0003	0.46	0.0006	0.0020	0.54
Δ_{it} : market portfolio v	•						
$cov(w_{it}^{ins}-w_{i,t-1}^{m};$	$r_{i,t+1} - E[r_{i,t+1}])$	0.0006	-0.0018	0.66	-0.0034	-0.0064**	0.61
A.2; HCM with inter Δ_{it} : lagged insider por $cov(w_{its}^{ins} - w_{it-1}^{ins};$	rtfolio weights				th future 0.0025	return horizo	on ($ au=3$) 0.84
$(n_{it}, n_{i,t-1})$	-1,1+5 =[-1,1+5])	0.0001	0.0000	0.01	0.0020	0.0011	0.01
Δ_{it} : market portfolio v	weights						
$cov(w_{it}^{ins}-w_{i,t-1}^{m};$	$r_{i,t+3}-E[r_{i,t+3}]\big)$	-0.0001	-0.0066	0.69	-0.0147	-0.0226**	0.72
		_					
A.3: HCM with long ∆ _{it} : lagged insider por		mation:	six-month	future	return ho	rizon ($ au = 6$)	
	•	0.0007	0.0005	0.62	-0.0012	0.0039	0.43
$cov(w_{it}^{ins}-w_{i,t-1}^{ins};$	$r_{i,t+6} - \mathcal{L}[r_{i,t+6}])$	0.0007	-0.0005	0.05	-0.0012	0.0039	0.43
∆ _{it} : market portfolio v	weights						
$cov(w^{ins} - w^m)$;		-0.0154	-0.0082	0.79	-0.0438	F0:0428****	t, Staganger. Oc
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Zero post-quota holdings-based performance

(HCM, 2008-2016)

		der-owner tfolio weig	•	Insider-value portfolio weights		
	Female (1)	Male (2)	p(diff) (3)	Female (4)	Male (5)	p(diff) (6)
B.1: HCM with short-lived insider info	rmation:	one-mor	th futur	e return	horizon ($ au=1$)	
$ \begin{array}{l} \Delta_{it} \colon \textit{lagged insider portfolio weights} \\ \textit{cov}(w_{it}^{\textit{ins}} - w_{i,t-1}^{\textit{ins}} \:; r_{i,t+1} - \textit{E}[r_{i,t+1}]) \end{array} $	0.0014	0.0004	0.70	0.0008	-0.0006	0.28
Δ_{it} : market portfolio weights cov $(w_{it}^{ins} - w_{i,t-1}^m; r_{i,t+1} - E[r_{i,t+1}])$	0.0033	-0.0041	0.39	0.0008	0.0014	0.88
B.2; HCM with intermediate-lived insi	de inforn	nation: th	ree-mon	th future	return horizon	(<i>tau</i> = 3)
$ \Delta_{it}: \text{ lagged insider portfolio weights} \\ cov(w_{it}^{ins} - w_{i,t-1}^{ins}; r_{i,t+3} - E[r_{i,t+3}]) $	0.0018	0.0007	0.72	0.0009	-0.0024Zero p	0.06
$ \Delta_{it}: market portfolio weights cov(w_{it}^{ins} - w_{i,t-1}^{m}; r_{i,t+3} - E[r_{i,t+3}]) $	0.0069	-0.0048	0.53	0.0004	0.0070	0.41
B.3: HCM with long-lived insider infor	mation:	six-montl	n future	return ho	rizon ($ au=6$)	
$\Delta_{it}: \text{ lagged insider portfolio weights} \\ \text{cov}(w_{it}^{\text{ins}} - w_{i,t-1}^{\text{ins}}; r_{i,t+6} - E[r_{i,t+6}])$				0.0016	-0.0041	0.09
	0.0011	0.0012	1.00	0.0010		
∆ _{i+} : market portfolio weights Eckbo/Ødegaard	Board ge	nder-balan	cing	18	Forskermøtet, / 22	Stavanger. Oct

Alternative: Returns-based portfolio performance

Jensen's alpha:

$$\alpha_{pt} \equiv \begin{cases} \alpha_{pt}^{4f} = r_{pt}^{e} - [\widehat{\beta}_{p}^{m} (r_{mt} - r_{ft}) + \widehat{b}_{p1} SMB_{t} + \widehat{b}_{p2} HML_{t} + \widehat{b}_{p3} MOM_{t}] \\ \\ \alpha_{pt}^{rb} = r_{pt}^{e} - [\widehat{\beta}_{p,t-1}^{rb} (r_{mt} - r_{ft})] \end{cases}$$

- α^{rb}_{pt}, is the constant term in the rolling-beta estimation of the one-factor Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which allows for time variation in the portfolio's (lagged) market risk factor exposure β^{rb}_{p,t-1}.
- Main result: Zero abnormal portfolio performance both before and after the quota law

Likelihood of director trading during financial crisis

$$Y_{jt} = \alpha + \beta_1 Crisis_t + \beta'_2 Controls_{jt} + \epsilon_{jt}$$

 $Y_{jt} = 1$ if one or more directors trades in quarter t, 1998–2016

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	Female I	Directors	Male D	Directors		
	Purchases (1)	Sales (2)	Purchases (3)	Sales (4)		
Constant	-2.544***	-3.591***	-2.080***	-2.516***		
	(0.366)	(0.849)	(0.178)	(0.270)		
Crisis	0.227***	-0.628**	0.229***	-0.144**		
	(0.055)	(0.274)	(0.033)	(0.064)		
Market Cap	0.019	0.026	0.013*	0.014		
	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.012)		
Volatility	1.537**	1.716*	1.040***	0.966***		
	(0.603)	(0.920)	(0.217)	(0.282)		
Liquidity	-2.908***	-6.533*	-2.967***	-3.264***		
	(1.064)	(3.560)	(0.459)	(0.748)		
Beta	-0.022	0.007	0.011	0.035		
	(0.043)	(0.095)	(0.020)	(0.029) Forskerm	øtet, Stavanger.	Oct 20
ard	Board	gender-balanc	ing	20 / 22		

Our proposition

- At the time of the financial crisis, male and female insiders had access to similar-sized director networks
- With equal access, insiders tend to agree on the interpretation of exogenous price shocks

Proposition (crisis-induced insider trading): *Insiders who respond by purchasing additional shares do so for two reasons:*

- (1) They believe that the market is (temporarily) undervaluing the firm.
- (2) They restore an optimal portfolio allocation between risky and risk-free assets.

Reason (1) predicts positive abnormal trading performance. Reason (2) predicts a greater asset purchase the lower the insider's risk aversion.

HCM-performance: insider purchases during financial crisis

		ler-owner folio weig	•	Insider-value portfolio weights		
	Female (1)	Male (2)	p(diff) (3)	Female (4)		p(diff) (6)
A: HCM with short-lived insider inform Δ_{it} : lagged insider portfolio weights	()	()	()	. ,	. ,	. ,
$cov(w_{it}^{ins} - w_{i,t-1}^{ins}; r_{i,t+1} - E[r_{i,t+1}])$	-0.0070	-0.0013	0.36	-0.0046	-0.0013	0.61
B; HCM with intermediate-lived inside Δ_{it} : lagged insider portfolio weights	e informat	tion: thre	e-month	future re	eturn horiz	con ($ au=3$)
$\frac{E_{i,t}}{cov}(w_{it}^{ins} - w_{i,t-1}^{ins}; r_{i,t+3} - E[r_{i,t+3}])$	-0.0031	-0.0018	0.82	-0.0004	-0.0025	0.78
C: HCM with long-lived insider inform Δ_{it} : lagged insider portfolio weights				urn horiz	on ($ au=$ 6)	1
$cov(w_{it}^{ins} - w_{i,t-1}^{ins}; r_{i,t+6} - E[r_{i,t+6}])$	-0.0047	-0.0015	0.56	0.0014	-0.0061	0.42
Zero abnormal performanc	e					
Purchase intensity reflects	individ	dual ris	sk ave	rsion		
Female directors no more	risk av	erse th	an m	ale dir	ectors	
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 $\begin{array}{c} \Rightarrow \\ \Rightarrow \\ \Rightarrow \\ \Rightarrow \end{array}$

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