

# Tick Size Wars. Competitive Tick Size Regimes and Trader Behavior

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## 1 Intro

### Tick Size Wars: Explicit price grid competition

- Global regulators enforce harmonized tick size schedules
- Leads to “implicit” tick size competition
  - Dark pools (almost continuous tick size in the US, midpoint Europe)
  - Inverted / Asymmetric (maker/taker) fee structures
- Each regulatory intervention seeking to eliminate implicit competition met by ever more imaginative structures.


### This study

- The impacts of *pure* exchange tick size competition
- The immediate responses of HFT liquidity suppliers

## 2 Events of War

### The Tick Size Wars of '09


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
### Events of War

- 2007: MiFID
- 2008: Chi-X, BATS, Turquoise starts trading limited range UK, Scandinavian stocks.
- June 2009: Chi-X, BATS, Turquoise reduces tick sizes selected LSE, Scandinavian stocks.
- Later that month: LSE reacts, all exchanges trade London shares on new lower tick.
- Early July: OSE reacts, competitive lowering of tick sizes, but still higher than competitors.
- Fall: Pan-European agreement on common tick sizes across all exchanges.

### BP at LSE: Tick size evolution




### Market aggregate: Relative Tick (Oslo)



Relative tick size: Tick size/stock price

### Market Share Consequences




## 3 Effect on Market Quality of first lowering of tick sizes

### Effect on market quality of first lowering of tick sizes

- Spreads (transaction costs) fall in both away and home markets
- Depth is unchanged
- Volume increases in both home and away markets.

## Spread (NBBO) around first move



## 4 Total effects – pre to post harmonization


### Total effects – pre-war to post-harmonization

- Spreads (transaction costs) fall in both away and home markets
- Depth falls
- Volume
  - decreases in home markets.
  - increases in away markets.

### Spread (NBBO) throughout the war




Depth throughout the war (Oslo)



## 5 Quoting behavior in small-tick market


Competition from small-tick markets



**Quoting strategies in small-tick markets**


Possibilities

- Undercutting of prices at the large-tick exchange?
- Price competition at the small-tick exchange?




**Chi-X improvement on OSE price**

Fraction of day Chi-X improves on OSE price




What are traders using small-tick market for?



**Placing of Chi-X quotes relative to main market**


When tick sizes are the same:



Example: NHY at Oslo


**Placing of Chi-X quotes relative to main market**

When Chi-X tick sizes are smaller:



Example: NHY at Oslo

**How often does Chi-X improve by more than one tick?**



Case: Oslo


**Competitive small tick markets**

**HFT traders at the small-tick markets**

- Use the small-tick markets to undercut main market by minimal ticks.
- Do *not* use to the small-tick market to move prices towards a less constrained equilibrium.



## Minimal effect on NBBO



Relative Spreads for OSE stocks

## 6 Conclusion

### Summary

'09 Tick Size War: Exchanges' competitive lowering tick size

- Entrant exchanges undercut to gain market share.
- Immediate loss of market for old exchanges:
  - 100% → 50% time at best quote
  - 98% → 92% trading volume
- Market quality effects: pre-war → post-war (post-harmonization)
  - Spreads (transaction costs) fall in both away and home markets
  - Depth falls
  - Volume
    - \* decreases in home markets.
    - \* increases in away markets.
- Quoting behavior: Traders use small-tick market to undercut main market by one tick, not for price competition on the small-tick market.

### Implications - A Race to the bottom?

- Explicit tick size competition leads to undercutting behavior.
- HFT market makers undercut by only one new tick – No new “equilibrium” spread.

- Regulation required to avoid explicit tick size competition
- With regulation requiring harmonized ticks, implicit competition emerges
  - Midpoint Dark Trading (Europe)
  - Fractional Dark Trading (US)
  - Large in Scale Blocks
  - Inverted Fee Venues
- Narrower unconstrained tick sizes may eliminate this competitive conduct.